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Overview
Businesses  throughout  the  US  econ-
omy  continue  to  transform  even  after 
the technology boom has faded. The key 
sources of this continuing transformation 
are  investment  in  the  information  tech-
nology  (IT)  package  (hardware,  software, 
and  business-service  applications)  and 
reorientation  of  business  activities  and 
processes  to  use  both  information  and 
technology effectively. 
Globalized production of IT hardware 
led  to  lower  prices  during  the  1990s, 
prompting IT investment and transforma-
tion. While IT was disruptive to businesses 
and workers alike, its influence on them 
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and their successful response to that in-
fluence were key to higher trend produc-
tivity growth and the associated “trifecta” 
of  faster  income  growth,  lower  inflation, 
and more employment. 
Deeper transformation and wider dif-
fusion of IT throughout the US economy 
will bring about a second wave of produc-
tivity growth. To that end, an international 
value  chain  should  increasingly  produce 
not only hardware but also software and 
services, which will lead to a decline in the 
prices of software and services, thus mak-
ing  the  overall  IT  package  affordable  for 
more businesses. Moreover, the now less 
expensive imported software and services 
can be knit together by people in the Unit-
ed States who are close to the customer 
and can combine and tailor these inputs to 
the specific needs of businesses here. 
The  globalization  of  software  and  IT 
services means that some IT jobs will be 
done abroad. But as more sectors of the 
economy and more businesses use the IT 
packages in the United States, high-skill 
jobs to design and tailor IT packages will 
increase  in  the  IT  sector,  and  jobs  de-
manding the skills to use these IT pack-
ages effectively will diffuse throughout the 
economy. 
This policy brief concludes that:
•  Globalization  of  IT  hardware  produc-
tion is a model for the global evolution 
of  IT  services  and  software.  Although 
technological change is the most impor-
tant driver of IT price declines, globalized 
production and international trade made 
IT hardware some 10 to 30 percent less 
expensive than it otherwise would have 
been. These lower prices translated into 
higher  productivity  growth  and  an  ac-Number PB03-11 December 2003 2
cumulated $230 billion in additional GDP (1995–
2002).  Real  GDP  growth  might  have  averaged 
0.3 percentage points less per year from 1995 to 
2002, if globalized production of IT hardware had 
not occurred.
• As IT hardware prices have declined, the impor-
tance of IT services and software in the IT package 
has increased from 58 to 69 percent of IT spend-
ing in 1993 and 2001, respectively. Over the same 
period, growth in software and services spending 
at 12.5 percent overwhelmed growth in hardware 
spending at 6.7 percent. In the face of this de-
mand, and enabled only since the mid-1990s by 
the Internet and standardization of methods, soft-
ware and services are now beginning to be pro-
duced globally. Just as for IT hardware, globally 
integrated production of IT software and services 
will  reduce  these  prices  and  make  tailoring  of 
business-specific packages affordable, which will 
promote further diffusion of IT use and transfor-
mation throughout the US economy.
• When some production of software and services 
is  done  abroad,  some  jobs  will  be  done  abroad 
too. Recent efforts to quantify IT-related and other 
white collar job loss “offshore” frequently use the 
peak  of  the  economic  and  technology  boom  as 
the base for analysis, thus ignoring the business 
cycle,  trend  decline  in  manufacturing  employ-
ment, dollar overvaluation, and technology bust. 
Cutting through the technology boom and peak of 
the business cycle and comparing end-1999 with 
October  2003,  employment  in  architecture  and 
engineering  occupations  is  stable,  that  in  com-
puter and mathematical occupations is 6 percent 
higher and in business and financial occupations, 
9 percent higher.
• Going forward, broader diffusion of IT through-
out the economy points to even greater demand 
for workers with IT skills and proficiency. In the 
1990s,  investment  in  IT  propelled  job  growth 
for workers with IT skills to twice the rate of job 
growth in the overall economy. Over the next de-
cade, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projects 
that job growth to 2010 in occupations requiring 
IT skills will be more than three times the rate of 
job growth in the overall economy.
• Globalization of software and services, enhanced 
IT use and transformation of activities in new sec-
tors,  and  job  creation  are  mutually  dependent. 
Breaking  the  links,  by  limiting  globalization  of 
software and services or by restricting IT invest-
ment and transformation of activities or by having 
insufficient skilled workers at home, puts robust 
and  sustainable  US  economic  performance  at 
risk. 
IT and US Economic Performance: 
Past as Prologue 
Researchers  and  the  media  alike  have  scruti-
nized  IT’s  role  in  US  economic  performance—the 
dramatic gains in the second half of the 1990s, the 
recent  recession,  and  the  mixed  signals  in  2003. 
Researchers have agreed that investment in IT and 
transformation  of  business  activities  in  response 
to IT investment accounted for half or more of the 
acceleration in labor productivity growth of the US 
economy between the first half of the 1990s and the 
second  half  through  2001  (Jorgenson  and  Stiroh 
2000, Stiroh 2001). Overall, faster trend productiv-
ity growth supports higher sustainable GDP growth, 
higher living standards, and more jobs, although it 
does not eliminate the business cycle or its effect on 
output and jobs.
With  respect  to  jobs  and  IT,  two  factors  have 
supported superior US labor-market performance. 
First,  as  businesses  integrate  IT  into  their  activi-
ties, price inflation slows. Thus policymakers can 
keep  interest  rates  lower  for  longer  without  wor-
rying  that  fast  economic  growth  might  lead  to  a 
price-wage spiral. This faster “speed limit” for the 
economy translates into more room for job growth. 
Indeed, the overall US unemployment rate fell below 
4 percent in 2000 without generating inflationary 
pressures. 
Second,  when  firms  across  the  economy  inte-
grate IT into their operations, there is a substantial 
demand  for  workers  with  IT  skills,  ranging  from 
basic IT literacy (“data entry keyers”) to much more 
advanced IT skills (database administrators or com-
puter software engineers).1 Some of these jobs are 
at IT-producing firms, but more generally they are 
spread throughout the economy as businesses inte-
grate IT into their activities. Through the economic 
boom  of  the  1990s,  jobs  that  demanded  IT  skills 
Deeper transformation and wider diffusion 
of IT throughout the US economy will 
bring about a second wave of productivity 
growth.
1 See the classification of IT occupations in table A5.4 in Digital 
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(not just at IT-producing firms) increased by 22 per-
cent, double the rate of job creation in the economy 
as a whole. 
Globalized IT Production and Prices 
What  role  did  globalization  play  in  the  1990s 
scenario? Globalization of production through trade 
and investment is important for IT’s contributions 
to US economic success. Looking back, global inte-
gration of IT production accounts for perhaps 10 to 
30 percent of the dramatic decline in IT hardware 
prices,  which  was  key  both  for  increased  invest-
ment in IT capital and to release financial resources 
needed to transform activities within firms to use IT 
most effectively. 
There are sufficiently detailed data on two spe-
cific products to examine the role of globalization 
in their price declines. For dynamic random access 
memory (DRAMs), squeezing margins between pro-
duction cost and market price is an important fac-
tor in changing the pace of the overall trend decline 
in price (Aizcorbe 2001). (Technology fundamentally 
drives the trend decline.) Regression analysis con-
firms that when a gap opens between global capacity 
and actual production, the decline in DRAM prices 
accelerates. So, increased global capacity of foreign 
firms and foreign investment by US firms accelerate 
the decline in DRAM prices.2 For personal comput-
ers (PC), cheaper semiconductors (including DRAM) 
explain about half the decline in PC prices.3 In addi-
tion, regression analysis indicates that an increase 
in net imports of PCs is associated with a lowering of 
PC prices. Thus, globalized production and imports 
of PCs by US firms as well as foreign suppliers sig-
nificantly reduce the price of this ubiquitous busi-
ness tool.4 Putting these estimates together, global 
integration of the IT hardware industry accounted 
for perhaps 10 to 30 percent of the decline in IT 
hardware prices.
Lower  IT  prices  promote  IT  investment  and 
transformation,  which  together  support  produc-
tivity  and  GDP  growth.  In  this  logic  chain,  how 
important is the global link? Taking the midpoint 
of the estimates, suppose IT prices fell 20 percent 
faster from 1995 to 2002 because production was 
globally integrated. These price declines supported 
additional investment in IT, which translates into 
productivity  growth.  Faster  productivity  growth 
supported higher GDP growth. All told, the calcula-
tions suggest that productivity growth might have 
been  2.5  percent  instead  of  2.8  percent  for  the 
1995–2002 period and that annual real GDP growth 
might  therefore  have  been  0.3  percentage  points 
lower if global integration of IT production had not 
occurred. The potential difference in GDP growth for 
the seven-year period cumulates to a conservative 
$230 billion (and perhaps twice this amount).5
The Next Wave of Productivity Growth
Whereas productivity gains from intensive use 
of IT are clear, large segments of the US economy 
have not yet integrated IT fully into their business 
operations.  Continuing  to  reduce  the  price  and 
making the IT package easier to use and a better 
fit for the organization that buys it are necessary to 
2 Research suggests that squeezing margins between produc-
tion cost and market price can account for an average of about 
15 percent of the decline in prices, although the year-to-year 
range is huge—from no margin squeeze in some years (such 
1995Q2 or 2000Q3) to squeezes of 20 or 30 percent in others 
(such as 1998Q3 and 2001Q3). Margins can narrow because 
of the business cycle (demand booms or falls) or because new 
facilities come on line and increase supply. For the specific type 
of DRAM, regression analysis confirms that when a gap opens 
between capacity and production (i.e., capacity utilization falls), 
the decline in DRAM prices accelerates. Based on the regres-
sion analysis, a 2.5 percentage point fall in capacity utilization 
(say from 87.5 to 85 percent) is associated with an acceleration 
of the pace of decline in DRAM prices from 2.5 percent (quar-
terly rate) to 10 percent (quarterly rate), as producers sell their 
product into looser supply-demand conditions at relatively lower 
prices. 
3 Detailed research on the relationship between the prices of 
PCs and semiconductors (DRAM as well as other types of chips) 
finds that about 40 to 60 percent of the decline in PC prices is 
due to the decline in semiconductor prices. About 30 percent 
of the semiconductors that go into a PC are DRAM (Aizcorbe, 
Flamm, and Khurshid 2002).
4 Net imports of PCs averaged $200 million per quarter over the 
period, with a variation of about $50 million around that aver-
age. Regression analysis suggests that a $50 million increase in 
net imports of PCs is associated with a lowering of PC prices of 
about 10 percent in the quarter that more PCs entered the US 
market.
5 Calculations are as follows: ‘X’ percent of price decline due to 
globalization (times) price elasticity of IT investment (equals) 
change in IT investment’s contribution to productivity growth. 
Using the growth accounting framework adjusts GDP growth 
and translates into billions of dollars “gained” due to globaliza-
tion of IT. To be conservative, only the relationship between 
lower prices and greater IT capital is calculated (the effect on 
productivity of so-called IT-capital deepening). However, there 
is a positive association between IT capital and total factor 
productivity, which together make up the principal components 
of labor productivity. Based on simple reckoning on the relative 
magnitude of IT capital deepening and total factor productiv-
ity growth, the ratio between the two could be 1:1. Thus, the 
magnitude of GDP growth accounted for by globalization of IT 
production could be twice the figures calculated here.
To put this figure into perspective, Kenneth Flamm (1997), 
using data from 1975–95, calculated a cumulative gain of $375 
billion coming from falling semiconductor prices. His data 
covered the period before the pervasive use of IT throughout 
nontechnology sectors.Number PB03-11 December 2003 4
deepen and spread more widely the use of IT and 
the associated transformation of activities.
Making IT easier to use and a better fit for an 
organization  comes  in  part  from  increasing  the 
software  and  IT  services  components  of  the  IT 
package. During the 1990s, the pattern of spend-
ing on the components of IT packages changed to 
increase the dominance of the market for software 
and particularly IT services. In 1993, spending on 
IT services and software was $115 billion whereas 
that on hardware was $81 billion. Over the course 
of the decade, the growth in spending on IT services 
and  software  combined  was  12.5  percent  (nearly 
twice the 6.7 percent growth rate seen in spending 
on IT hardware) to end in 2001 (year 1 postbubble) 
at $136 billion for IT hardware and $296 billion for 
IT services and software. Spending on services and 
software now dominates the US market, which is an 
incentive to both reduce costs and offer new prod-
ucts.6 Globalization of production, enabled by the 
Internet, offers one way to do both. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between IT in-
tensity and contribution to aggregate productivity 
growth in the United States by sector, along with 
the size of the sectors in terms of GDP. The sectors 
best known for their uptake of IT during the 1990s, 
including wholesale trade, securities and commod-
ity  brokers,  depository  institutions,  and  telecom-
munications  are  clearly  identifiable.  Retailing  is 
the only notable example of a large sector that did 
not use IT particularly intensively in the sector as 
a whole but experienced above-average productiv-
ity growth.7 Three other sectors stand out for being 
large, low IT intensive, and below average in terms 
of productivity: health services, construction, and 
the highly heterogeneous group of “other services” 
(figure 1).8
In  addition,  small  and  medium-sized  enter-
prises (SMEs) generally have invested less in pro-
ductivity-enhancing IT. The size and distribution of 
firms suggest that the sectors noted above (health 
and  construction)  have  particularly  high  popula-
tions of SMEs, where IT investment per employee 
has been significantly less than at their large-firm 
counterparts and drastically less than in durable 
manufacturing,  which  has  led  the  way  in  terms 
of IT investment, transformation, and productivity 
growth (table 1). 
There  is  evidence  that  IT-based  productivity 
gains can be had in these “lagging” sectors. IT ap-
plications  in  health  services,  for  example,  show 
dramatic results. Adverse drug events (ADEs) are 
the human face of productivity in the health sector.9 
Besides causing an estimated 372,000 preventable 
injuries and deaths per year, ADEs cost an extra 
annual $1.56 billion to $5.6 billion in hospital ex-
penses per year.10 Bar-coding of prescription medi-
cation and blood products, along with an electronic 
medical  record  system,  could  prevent  more  than 
80,000 ADEs annually in the United States. IT also 
directly affects costs: Telemedicine improves patient 
recovery, decreases readmission, and reduces costs 
(by 80 percent) simply by allowing basic daily medi-
cal  checks  (weight,  blood  pressure,  blood  sugar, 
etc.) to be performed regularly at home and then 
transmitted to the central database by phone. 
More  generally,  reasons  ranging  from  cost  to 
culture to regulatory constraints help explain why 
IT may be used less intensively in some sectors and 
6 This increasing dominance of software and services is charac-
teristic of other industrial countries as well but is not observed 
in the emerging markets, where the demand for hardware is 
rising faster. See Mann with Kirkegaard (2003, table 1.1 and 
figure 1.2).
7 Although the sector as a whole does not appear to use IT 
particularly intensively, research shows that much of the pro-
ductivity gain in retailing comes from more productive estab-
lishments replacing less productive ones and that IT was an 
important factor underpinning the more productive establish-
ments. See Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002). 
8 The values of ITEQ/FTE, a measure of IT intensity (from Digi-
tal Economy 2002, table A4.4), have been converted to natural 
logarithm values to increase dispersion in figure 1. (ITEQ/FTE 
stands for information technology equipment/full time equiva-
lent [worker].) A total of 55 industries, representing 78 percent 
of US GDP in 2000 are represented in figure 1. Remaining GDP 
is largely constituted by the real estate and government sectors 
for which no IT intensity estimates are available. In figure 1, the 
category “other services”, consists of SIC categories 83 (social 
services), 84 (museums, art galleries, and botanical and zoologi-
cal gardens), 86 (membership organizations), 87 (engineering, 
accounting, research, management, and related services), and 
89 (services, not elsewhere classified).
9 Adverse drug events (ADE) is the term used to describe inju-
ries not caused by the underlying disease or condition of the 
patient but rather from the drug therapy incurred by the pa-
tient. Although hard to infer direct productivity implications of 
a reduction in ADE, fewer ADEs would, at a minimum, reduce 
the need for remedial action, which would raise the productivity 
of the sector. 
10 See Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2001) and 
McClellan (2003). All information originating from the Food and 
Drug Administration is from McClellan (2003).
An essential ingredient of the second 
wave of productivity growth coming from 
globalization of software and IT services is 
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Figure 1: IT intensity and contribution to GDP per FTE growth, 1989–2000 
Table 1: Capital expenditure per employee by industry sector and size of company, 1998




Share of total 
employment (percent)
Durable manufacturing
Small and medium (0 to 
499 employees)
942 4,562 38.5
Large (500+ employees) 1,463 20,291 61.5
Construction
Small and medium 112 3,250 89.6
Large  493 3,731 10.4
Health
Small and medium 231 1,284 43.1
Large 476 2,760 56.9
Source: US Department of Commerce, Main Street In the Digital Age, table 3.
ITEQ/FTE = Information technology equipment/full-time equivalent (worker).
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, Digital Economy 2002, table A4.4.
Size of bubbles indicates share of GDP by individual sectorNumber PB03-11 December 2003 6
by certain sizes of firms. Nascent globalization of 
software and services, if it takes the pattern of price 
declines that enable development of higher valued-
added and sector-specific applications (as has been 
the case with globalization of IT hardware), could 
help  vault  these  hurdles.  The  result  would  be  IT 
diffusion to and more extensive transformation of 
sectors and firm sizes that have lagged in terms of 
productivity growth, as well as deeper integration of 
IT software and services into the sectors that have 
already enjoyed significant productivity gains based 
on hardware. The resulting second wave of produc-
tivity  growth  could  be  even  greater  than  the  one 
experienced in the 1990s. 
Globalization of Software and Services and IT 
Job Loss 
The  advent  of  the  Internet,  standardization  of 
methods, and creation of databases of information 
and  knowledge  enable  the  disaggregation  of  soft-
ware and services into stages, which do not need to 
be done contiguously but can instead be done glob-
ally. While this may contribute positively to produc-
tivity growth via price declines, as detailed earlier, 
the specter of losing “white collar” IT jobs abroad 
looms  large.  Frequently  cited  projections  indicate 
that millions of jobs will be lost to offshore workers. 
What these projections ignore is that the globaliza-
tion of software and IT services, in conjunction with 
diffusion of IT to new sectors and businesses, will 
yield even stronger job demand in the United States 
for workers with IT proficiency and skills. 
Even  now,  stories  that  report  dramatic  move-
ment of jobs offshore need to be put into the current 
economic  perspective.  First,  these  citations  fre-
quently use the peak of the economy and technology 
boom as the base for their analysis, thus ignoring 
the business cycle, trend decline in manufacturing 
employment,  dollar  overvaluation,  and  technology 
bust.11 Second, data on international trade do not 
corroborate the frequent citations but rather point 
to  sustained  international  competitiveness  of  US 
service providers. 
Table  2  shows  developments  in  the  US  labor 
market from 1999 to October 2003. These data cut 
through the technology boom and peak of the busi-
ness cycle but also clearly show the slow recovery in 
employment so far. Data confirm disproportionate 
and continuing employment losses in manufactur-
ing (2.7 million or 16 percent since 1999), including 
production  jobs  in  the  IT  sector.  Among  occupa-
tional categories, there similarly has been a trend 
decline  in  “management  occupations,”  where  1.1 
million jobs have disappeared since 1999 (a 14 per-
cent decline). In contrast, employment in the private 
service–providing  sector  increased  throughout  the 
period and is 1.5 percent higher in October 2003 
compared with 1999. 
Employment in white collar occupations related 
to IT or deemed vulnerable to IT-enabled interna-
tional trade, is stable and recovering (architecture 
and engineering occupations) or higher (computer 
and mathematical occupations is 6 percent higher 
and business and financial occupations, 9 percent 
higher) in October 2003 compared with 1999. With-
out a doubt there is offshore job activity, and the 
domestic labor market situation remains subdued, 
but job growth in many white collar occupations at 
home deemed particularly at risk to offshore opera-
tions is expanding, not contracting. (The full range 
of occupations categorized by the BLS is shown in 
the appendix table.) 
A  second  piece  of  evidence  on  the  continued 
strength of the US services sector comes from inter-
national trade data (figure 2). The continued strong 
competitive showing of US net exports of services 
is  particularly  striking  given  the  appreciation  of 
the dollar from 1995 to 2002 and slow growth in 
the United States’s major markets in the industrial 
11 There are no publicly available data on jobs “lost” to workers 
in foreign countries. Publicly available data show the number 
of people in occupations defined by occupational class and 
by sector. When the number of jobs falls in a particular cell 
of this matrix, there is no way to determine whether that job 
was regained in another cell of the matrix (different occupation 
or different sector) or whether this job no longer exists, either 
because the job has moved abroad or because technology has 
made it obsolete. 
Frequently cited projections indicate that 
millions of jobs will be lost to offshore 
workers. What these projections ignore is 
that the globalization of software and IT 
services, in conjunction with diffusion of 
IT to new sectors and businesses, will yield 
even stronger job demand in the United 
States for IT-proficient workers. Number PB03-11 December 2003 7
Table 2: The current employment situation (thousands of workers at end of period)
Sector/occupation 1999 2000 2001 2002
Current, 
October 2003 (P)
Total nonfarm private 
employment
109,972 111,639 109,302 108,642 108,644
Manufacturing 17,280 17,177 15,706 15,020 14,540
Private service providing 85,393 87,066 86,216 86,319 86,692
Total IT occupationsa 6,136 6,383 6,061 5860 n.a.
of which
Nonproduction 5,637 5,876 5,643 5492 n.a.
Production 499 507 418 368 n.a.
Management 8,063 7,783 7,212 7,092 6,940b
Business and financial 4,362 4,619 4,677 4,772 4,774b
Computer and mathematical 2,620 2,933 2,826 2,773 2,775b
Architecture and engineering 2,506 2,576 2,489 2,411 2,505b
Unemployment rate 
(16 years and above)
Annual average (percent) 4.2 4.0 4.8 5.8 6.0c
End of period (percent) 4.0 3.9 5.8 6.0 6.0
n.a. = not available
(P) = Preliminary estimate.
a. IT occupations as defined by the US Department of Commerce in Digital Economy 2002, annual data.   
b. The October 2003 number has been generated by using the rate of change from October 2002 to October 2003 in the 
unseasonally adjusted data from the BLS Current Population Survey, series LNU02032453 (management), LNU02032454 
(business and finance), LNU02032455 (computer and mathematical) and LNU02032456 (architecture and engineering), which 
covers the same occupational categories but uses a different survey format than does the BLS Annual Occupational Employment 
Survey.
c. January to October 2003.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Annual Occupational Employment Survey, monthly current population and establishment data.Number PB03-11 December 2003 8
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Computer and information systems managers
Medical records and health information technicians
Physician assistants
Social and human service assistants
Medical assistants
Computer systems analysts
Personal and home care aides
Database administrators
Desktop publishers
Network systems and data communications analysts
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Computer support specialists
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Figure 3: Percent change in employment in occupations projected to grow fastest, 2000–10
Note: Black bars are IT-related jobs as defined in Digital Economy 2002.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupation Outlook Handbook.








1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003(1)
Affiliated services: US parents, net
Affiliated services: US affiliates, net
Unaffiliated services: Financial services
Unaffiliated services: Business, professional, and technical services
Other private services 
a Annualized from 2003 Q1 and Q2 seasonally adjusted data.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, US International Transactions table 3, US private services 
transactions.
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countries abroad. The trade surplus in other private 
services (OPS) increased from $42 billion in 1997 
to about $50 billion in 2003Q1. OPS includes trade 
in services that might be vulnerable to being done 
abroad, including financial services and business, 
professional, and technical (BPT) services, both of 
which post strong positive net balances. 
Moreover, examination of the “affiliated” trade 
category (i.e., intrafirm trade between parent and 
subsidiary)  reveals  that  multinationals  (both  US 
and  foreign)  continue  to  do  their  headquarters’ 
service activities in the United States. Even as US 
multinationals expand overseas, global integration 
of their activities has not yielded a fall in their “affili-
ated parent, net” balance. Even more striking, for-
eign multinationals with US subsidiaries are more 
prone  to  integrating  their  service  transactions  in 
the United States rather than at their headquarters 
abroad (“affiliated services: US affiliates, net”). 
What are the prospects going forward for jobs 
that demand IT skills, some of which increasingly 
could be done abroad as part of global integration of 
software and IT services? The BLS Occupation Out-
look Handbook (OOH) details job projections (figure 
3). Three of the 10 largest numerical increases in 
job categories (a total of about 1.2 million jobs of 
the projected 22 million in the US economy by 2010) 
are projected to be in computer-related occupations 
(computer  support  specialists,  computer  software 
applications  engineers,  and  computer  software 
system engineers). Among the top 20 occupations 
in terms of growth prospects projected by the BLS, 
10  demand  IT  skills.12  All  of  these  are  frequently 
cited  in  anecdotes  as  ripe  for  being  sent  abroad 
(software engineers, network administrators, desk-
top publishers, computer and information system 
managers).  Considering  all  occupations  projected 
to 2010 by BLS, 13 percent of the total number of 
jobs created in the economy will be IT-related, and 
the growth in these occupations will be 43 percent, 
compared with an economywide job growth rate of 
13 percent.13
Not all job categories are projected to expand. 
Jobs  for  bank  tellers,  switchboard  operators  (in-
cluding answering services), and telephone opera-
tors are all projected to shrink by 20,000 to 60,000 
jobs each. But this contraction is as much due to 
automated  teller  machines  and  voice-answering 
technologies as due to jobs going offshore. Jobs for 
insurance claims clerks, word processors, and sec-
retaries also are projected to drop; these could be 
candidates for offshore job creation, replacing jobs 
at home. What is notable about all these jobs is that 
they are at the low-wage, low-skill end of the job 
spectrum that currently demands IT skills.14
The point is not that no jobs will be done abroad 
but rather that higher-paid jobs demanding IT skills 
are  projected  to  grow  very  quickly  in  the  United 
States. Will US workers be prepared to make the 
move into those jobs? Right now, it is imperative 
that adjustment assistance be made available to the 
white collar workers hurt by international competi-
tion just as trade adjustment assistance aids those 
in the manufacturing sector. The new program of 
wage insurance will help some IT workers find new 
jobs  but  not  necessarily  those  with  white  collar 
skills.15
A  partnership  between  the  private  and  public 
sectors  and  a  real  commitment  to  effective  skill-
building are crucial. For many years, tax policy has 
12 Other important job categories in terms of magnitude of 
openings are registered nurses, retail salespeople, office clerks, 
general mangers, teachers, and laborers.
13 How accurate have BLS projections of job growth been in 
the past? Evaluation of the projections in the 1988–2000 Oc-
cupational Outlook Handbook (OOH) is based on a six-category 
classification (centered around “about as fast as average” and 
ranging from “much faster than average” to “decline”). (As in the 
current OOH, each category is associated with specific percent-
age growth rates.) Of the 338 occupations evaluated, 187 had 
growth rates within one category of the projection category. 
There is even greater accuracy in the “extreme” categories of 
“much faster than average” and “decline,” with projections being 
“within a few thousand workers or a few percentage points.” See 
Alpert and Auyer (2003). 
An international value chain should 
increasingly produce not only hardware but 
also software and services, which will lead 
to a decline in the prices of software and 
services, thus making the overall IT package 
affordable for more businesses. 
14 See discussion of wage profile of job occupations in Kirkeg-
aard (2003).
15 As implemented in the trade promotion authority legislation, 
workers older than 50 years and earning less than $50,000 
at their previous job can receive half of the difference between 
their old and new wage for up to two years. The objective of this 
program is to encourage workers to get back to work as soon as 
possible and for the new employer to provide on-the-job train-
ing, which has proven to be more effective that government-fi-
nanced classroom training. The program is limited, however, by 
age as well as by type of job lost (only manufacturing jobs are 
covered). For more on wage insurance, see Kletzer and Litan 
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been used to promote capital investment through 
the investment tax credit. An essential ingredient to 
the second wave of productivity growth coming from 
globalization of software and IT services is human 
capital in the United States. The time has come to 
integrate human capital into investment tax credit 
policies.  The  US  workforce  needs  the  skills  and 
adaptive  capabilities  to  succeed  in  a  global  labor 
market, where fewer and fewer occupational catego-
ries can be shielded from foreign competition and 
where global competitors are spending even more 
on education relative to their income levels than is 
the United States.16
Going forward, the globalization of software and 
IT services and the movement of some jobs abroad 
reduce  the  price  of  “components.”  (Software  and 
services have components just as hardware does.) 
In the United States, the jobs will be to design, tai-
lor, and implement IT packages for a broader range 
of industries and size of firms as well as to deepen 
the  integration  of  IT  into  firms  that  already  have 
it. Suppose that global integration of software and 
services  yielded  price  declines  of  20  percent  (us-
ing the average of the results from the IT hardware 
research).  Since  the  demand  for  software  and  IT 
services is more price elastic than for IT hardware, 
the  potential  increase  in  investment,  productivity 
growth, and job creation from the globalization of 
IT services and software is even greater than that 
experienced in the 1990s from the globalization of IT 
hardware. Indeed, this second wave of productivity 
growth and the associated economywide gains de-
pend on deeper integration of IT and transformation 
of more sectors of the US economy and the workers 
who can engender and partake of these changes. 
Conclusion
Effective use of IT through investment and trans-
formation of activities was key to US economic ex-
pansion during the 1990s. Globalization of IT hard-
ware played an important role in that expansion. 
In order to return to the economic performance of 
the 1990s, the early IT adopters will have to deepen 
IT investment and transformation, and the process 
of  IT  investment  and  transformation  will  have  to 
be extended to the sectors of the US economy that 
did not participate in the productivity growth of the 
1990s—among them, health services, construction, 
and small and medium businesses. 
The IT package has been increasingly weighted 
toward software and IT services rather than hard-
ware. There is increasing incentive as well as need 
to provide more cost-effective and superior IT soft-
ware and services. Part of delivering on that strategy 
involves a new wave of globalization of IT in software 
and services, which will contribute to the lowering 
of the prices of software and services. Globalization 
of software and services will entail some jobs be-
ing done abroad but will result in lower prices for 
the  overall  IT  package.  The  resulting  greater  use 
of  IT  and  transformation  of  activities  throughout 
the economy will propel the United States toward 
a second wave of faster productivity growth that at 
the same time yields a greater demand for IT-related 
jobs spread throughout the economy. 
In the end, globalization of software and services, 
enhanced IT use and transformation of activities in 
new sectors, and job creation are mutually depen-
dent. Breaking the links, by limiting globalization of 
software and services or by restricting IT investment 
and transformation of activities or by having insuf-
ficient skilled workers at home, will put the entire 
prospect for robust and sustainable US economic 
performance at risk.
16 Research and data suggest that middle-income countries are 
investing relatively more in engineering and technical human 
capital than are rich countries (Sequeira 2003).
Globalization of software and services, 
enhanced IT use and transformation of 
activities in new sectors, and job creation 
are mutually dependent. Breaking the links 
will put the entire prospect for robust and 
sustainable US economic performance 
at risk.Number PB03-11 December 2003 11
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Table A.1. Detailed data on occupations
Number of workers
BLS occupation 
code BLS major occupational category 1999 2000 2001 2002
11-0000 Management  8,063,410 7,782,680 7,212,130 7,092,460
13-0000 Business and financial operations  4,361,980 4,619,270 4,676,690 4,772,120
15-0000 Computer and mathematical  2,620,080 2,932,810 2,825,820 2,772,620
17-0000 Architecture and engineering 2,506,380 2,575,620 2,489,040 2,411,260
19-0000 Life, physical, and social science 909,530 1,038,670 1,067,750 1,078,630
21-0000 Community and social services 1,404,540 1,469,000 1,523,940 1,576,980
23-0000 Legal 858,320 890,910 909,360 934,850
25-0000 Education, training, and library 7,344,830 7,450,860 7,658,800 7,772,470
27-0000 Arts, design, entertainment, sports, 
and media
1,551,600 1,513,420 1,508,730 1,503,680
29-0000 Healthcare practitioners and technical  6,001,950 6,041,210 6,118,880 6,185,020
31-0000 Healthcare support 2,970,780 3,039,430 3,123,160 3,173,400
33-0000 Protective service  2,958,730 3,009,070 2,958,050 2,993,490
35-0000 Food preparation and serving related 9,687,970 9,955,060 9,917,790 10,067,080
37-0000 Building and grounds cleaning and 
maintenance
4,274,200 4,318,070 4,275,660 4,262,880
39-0000 Personal care and service 2,556,920 2,700,510 2,801,640 2,919,280
41-0000 Sales and related  12,938,130 13,506,880 13,418,770 13,339,570
43-0000 Office and administrative support  22,562,480 22,936,140 22,798,460 22,754,570
45-0000 Farming, fishing, and forestry  463,360 460,700 453,010 451,140
47-0000 Construction and extraction 5,938,860 6,187,360 6,239,250 6,124,600
49-0000 Installation, maintenance, and repair 5,140,210 5,318,490 5,322,980 5,215,970
51-0000 Production  12,620,920 12,400,080 11,270,180 10,726,670
53-0000 Transportation and material moving 9,538,820 9,592,740 9,410,340 9,395,000
Total economy 127,274,000 129,738,980 127,980,430 127,523,740
Note: Categories in italics represent occupations deemed by Forrester to be at risk of offshoring.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), national employment and wage data from the Occupational Employment 
Statistics survey by occupation, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002.Number PB03-11 December 2003 13
Table A.1: Detailed data on occupations (continued)
1999–2000 2000–01 2001–02 1999–2002
–3.5 –7.3 –1.7 –12.0
5.9 1.2 2.0 9.4
11.9 –3.6 –1.9 5.8
2.8 –3.4 –3.1 –3.8
14.2 2.8 1.0 18.6
4.6 3.7 3.5 12.3
3.8 2.1 2.8 8.9
1.4 2.8 1.5 5.8
–2.5 –0.3 –0.3 –3.1
0.7 1.3 1.1 3.1
2.3 2.8 1.6 6.8
1.7 –1.7 1.2 1.2
2.8 –0.4 1.5 3.9
1.0 –1.0 –0.3 –0.3
5.6 3.7 4.2 14.2
4.4 –0.7 –0.6 3.1
1.7 –0.6 –0.2 0.9
–0.6 –1.7 –0.4 –2.6
4.2 0.8 –1.8 3.1
3.5 0.1 –2.0 1.5
–1.7 –9.1 –4.8 –15.0
0.6 –1.9 –0.2 –1.5
1.9 –1.4 –0.4 0.2
Precent change